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In Norman (2003a), the introduction of individual strategy switch-
ing costs, and thus inertia, into stochastic evolutionary coordination
games was found inter alia to strengthen the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium as a short- to medium-run equilibrium. This paper considers
the impact of such switching costs on the conﬂict scenario of Hawk-
Dove games. The “attractive” mixed-strategy equilibrium of Hawk-
Dove games represents a far better candidate for long-run equilibrium
than its unstable counterpart in coordination games, and yet robust
selection results have proved elusive, with conditions on the selection
dynamics generally being required. Such a condition remains a ne-
cessity in the switching cost model with state-independent mutations.
However, a more realistic model of state-dependent mutations driven
by stochastic switching costs overcomes this problem, and identiﬁes a
threshold mean switching cost, above which the mixed-strategy equi-
librium is selected in the long run for a wide class of switching cost
distributions.
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11 Introduction
“The truth is rarely pure, and never simple.”
Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest (1895) Act I
In Norman (2003a), the implications of player inertia in stochastic evo-
lutionary coordination games were considered. The presence of “switch-
ing costs” to individual strategy changes in the Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
(1993) (henceforth KMR) model was found to create a number of new short-
to medium-run equilibria, centred around the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
However, this unusual evolutionary justiﬁcation for the controversial concept
of mixed-strategy equilibrium did not extend to the long run, where risk-
dominance continued to reign supreme. But if the “unattractive” mixed-
strategy equilibrium of coordination games can be strengthened by inertia,
it is natural to ask what will be the eﬀect in games which have an “attrac-
tive” mixed-strategy equilibrium. This question motivates this paper’s shift
of focus to the conﬂict scenario of Hawk-Dove games.
In contrast to coordination games, the mixed-strategy equilibrium in
Hawk-Dove games constitutes the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. Yet
despite this “attractiveness” of the Hawk-Dove mixed-strategy equilibrium,
existing models (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993, Robson and Vega-Redondo
1996) have not found it to be selected robustly as a long-run equilibrium.
Instead, long-run behaviour in this “most problematic type of game”1 de-
pends crucially on the precise selection dynamic employed, and convergence
to the mixed-strategy equilibrium generally requires some restrictive con-
ditions to be placed on that dynamic. It is shown in section 3 that this
unhappy situation is essentially unaltered by the presence of switching costs
when the mutation rate is uniform; the same restrictive conditions must be
placed on the selection dynamic in order for the mixed-strategy equilibrium
to be selected, and in fact some dilution of this selection occurs due to the
creation of competing mixed absorbing states.
However, in section 4, the model is altered to make the switching cost
itself stochastic across players and time. This is a realistic modiﬁcation; in
reality, diﬀerent players (with diﬀerent priorities, abilities and constraints)
will vary in the size of their switching costs, and any given player’s switching
cost will ﬂuctuate in size over time (as his priorities, abilities and constraints
change). Moreover, the introduction of this stochastic switching cost obvi-
ates the need to introduce the state-independent mutations of the KMR-style
model, thus also serving to address the criticisms of Bergin and Lipman
(1996) by building a model with endogenously generated “state-dependent
mutations”. In this setting, the problem of requiring the selection dynamic
to meet a restrictive condition in order to select the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium of Hawk-Dove games is overcome. Instead, there is a threshold mean
1Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), p. 67.
2switching cost, above which the appropriate selection takes place for a wide
class of switching cost distributions.
To begin with, however, the next section introduces the relevant litera-
ture.
2 Relevant Literature
There is a longstanding controversy in game theory over the validity of
mixed-strategy equilibrium. Mixed-strategy equilibria are seen by many as
dubious on a number of grounds, chieﬂy doubts over whether players ran-
domise and whether knife-edge behaviour (playing with the exact required
probabilities) based on indiﬀerence can be stable. Various responses have
been oﬀered to these criticisms, generally oﬀering diﬀerent interpretations of
mixed-strategy equilibrium to that of individual-level randomisation taken
literally.2 The most notable of these is Harsanyi’s (1973) puriﬁcation argu-
ment, which implies that all mixed equilibria are approximations of strict,
and hence evolutionarily stable, equilibria of games with slightly perturbed
payoﬀs. However, the most interesting interpretation of mixed-strategy equi-
librium from an evolutionary standpoint is as a steady state of an environ-
ment in which players act repeatedly and ignore any strategic link that may
exist between plays.3 This is precisely the stochastic evolutionary paradigm:
statistical frequencies of current and/or past play form the basis of players’
beliefs about the future behaviour of the other players, which in turn form
the basis of their own play.
Stochastic evolutionary game theory was born in the papers of Foster and
Young (1990), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), and Young (1993). Foster
and Young (1990), drawing on the Markovian techniques of Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984), introduced the concept of stochastic stability in continuous
dynamical systems into evolutionary biology, and provided a method for the
analytical computation of the stochastically stable set. Kandori, Mailath,
and Rob (1993), and Young (1993) then brought the somewhat simpler
discrete analysis into the realm of economics. These papers provided the
basis of a new and fruitful direction for evolutionary game theory, appearing
to oﬀer a solution to the persistent problem of multiple equilibria and path
dependence: the long-run equilibrium of a stochastic model was unique for
generic games with strict Nash equilibria.
This “solution” was, however, soon questioned by Bergin and Lipman
(1996), who highlight the arbitrariness of mutations occurring at a rate inde-
pendent of the current state of the system. Such “state-independent muta-
tions”, embodied in the ﬁxed mutation rate " of KMR and others, imply that
2See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), pp. 37-44, for an excellent survey of such inter-
pretations.
3See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), pp. 38-9.
3players make mistakes (or experiment, etc.) with the same probability irre-
spective of the current strategy frequencies, and thus of the expected payoﬀs
at stake. Bergin and Lipman demonstrate that, given any model of the eﬀect
of mutations, any invariant distribution of the “mutationless” process is close
to an invariant distribution of the process with appropriately chosen small
mutation rates. This implies that any strict Nash equilibrium of a strategic
form game is selected under some suitably chosen mutation model. Bergin
and Lipman’s paper highlights the importance of developing models or other
criteria to determine “reasonable” classes of “state-dependent mutations”.
Myatt and Wallace (1998) present a candidate for just such a “reasonable”
mutation process with their model of state-dependent mutations driven by
payoﬀ heterogeneity (rather than mistakes, or experimentation). More gen-
erally, Blume (1999) alleviates the indeterminacy of the Bergin and Lipman
critique with his ﬁnding that the known stochastic stability results are pre-
served for the (large) class of noise processes satisfying a certain symmetry
condition.
On the basis of existing stochastic evolutionary work, however, there
is little support for the population steady state interpretation of mixed-
strategy equilibrium. In most stochastic evolutionary models, mixed-strategy
equilibria are unstable knife-edges, and as such are comprehensively dese-
lected in the long run. As will be seen in section 3 below, Kandori, Mailath,
and Rob (1993) and Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) do provide theo-
rems for long-run selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium in Hawk-Dove
games, but even this requires the imposition of apparently ad hoc constraints
on the selection dynamics. Oechssler (1997) also investigates evolutionary
convergence to mixed-strategy equilibrium, but again for a particular form
of selection dynamic; every period each player receives the opportunity to
adjust his strategy with probability µ 2 (0;1). This variable speed dy-
namic guarantees eventual convergence to the mixed-strategy equilibrium
in Hawk-Dove games.
Some models of learning and deterministic evolution have sought to jus-
tify mixed-strategy equilibrium in population contexts. In two related pa-
pers, Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) explore
a potential justiﬁcation for mixed-strategy equilibria based on the idea that
an equilibrium distribution might arise in a large population as the result
of a learning process in the style of ﬁctitious play. This follows the earlier
pessimistic result of Crawford (1985) that such a process is locally unstable
at the mixed equilibrium for almost all games. Fudenberg and Kreps (1993)
ﬁnd play unlikely to converge to a mixed-strategy equilibrium in their model,
until the stage game is perturbed in the manner of Harsanyi’s puriﬁcation
theorem, at which point such convergence becomes natural. Their paper and
several subsequent analyses show that, for the type of “smoothed” learning
models studied, play in 2 £ 2 games converges to the mixed equilibrium in
games like matching pennies, while the seemingly unreasonable mixed equi-
4libria of coordination games are unstable. Ellison and Fudenberg (2000),
meanwhile, extend the model to more complicated settings, and ﬁnd that
- contrary to some previous suggestions - learning can sometimes provide
a justiﬁcation for complicated mixed equilibria. Whether an equilibrium is
stable is found often to depend on the distribution of payoﬀ perturbations.
On the evolutionary side, meanwhile, Eshel and Sansone (1995) also ap-
peal to Harsanyi’s puriﬁcation argument in warning against a premature
rejection of mixed strategies in an evolutionary context, arguing that small
payoﬀ perturbations and incomplete information about opponents’ payoﬀs
are inescapable in realistic evolutionary models. Binmore and Samuelson
(2001) explore this idea further, seeking to reconcile Harsanyi’s defence
of mixed-strategy equilibrium with Selten’s (1980) demonstration that no
mixed equilibria are evolutionarily stable when players can condition their
strategies on their roles in a game. They ﬁnd that approximations of mixed
equilibria are likely to persist when payoﬀ perturbations are relatively im-
portant and role identiﬁcation is relatively noisy, but are unlikely to persist
when payoﬀ perturbations are unimportant and role identiﬁcation is precise.
However, despite all of this support in deterministic contexts (albeit
perturbed), as far as selection in explicit stochastic models is concerned, the
mixed-strategy equilibrium remains on very shaky ground. The contention
of this paper is that this ground becomes somewhat ﬁrmer in the presence
of switching costs.
The idea of inertia driven by switching costs in repeated game contexts is
of course not a new one. Within the traditional perfectly rational paradigm,
Klemperer’s (1987a, 1987b) consumer switching costs4 and Radner’s (1980)
"-Nash equilibrium are two obvious examples. The closest parallel to the
present paper in the perfectly rational literature, however, is Lipman and
Wang (2000), who study the eﬀects of switching costs in general repeated
game contexts. They add small costs of changing actions and frequent rep-
etition to ﬁnitely repeated games, and ﬁnd that doing so makes credible
certain commitments which then serve to overturn all the standard results
for ﬁnitely repeated games.
By contrast with the perfectly rational literature, however, it would seem
that inertia has for the most part been left unmodelled in evolutionary
contexts. In reinforcement models, for example, the probability of taking an
action in the present increases with the payoﬀ that resulted from taking that
action in the past.5 Such models admit an intuitive role for inertia, but this
inertia is assumed exogenous, its root causes left unmodelled. Meanwhile,
inertia plays an explicit role in the KMR (1993) model, with their weakly
4On consumer switching costs see, for example, Klemperer (1995), Beggs and
Klemperer (1992), Farrell and Klemperer (2001), Farrell (1987), Farrell and Shapiro
(1988, 1989), and Padilla (1995).
5See Bush and Mosteller (1955), Suppes and Atkinson (1960), Arthur (1993), Roth
and Erev (1995), B¨ orgers and Sarin (1995, 1997).
5monotonic selection dynamic capturing the idea that only some (as opposed
to all) players need be adjusting their behaviour in any given period. But
this ignores the important possibility that no player adjusts his behaviour in
a given period, and moreover, there is again no endogenous determination
of the inertia.
There are admittedly some evolutionary papers that model costly play
of some sort. One example is Sethi (1998), whose model of “strategy-speciﬁc
barriers to learning” in the replicator dynamics explores the consequences
of strategies varying in the ease with which they can be learned. Another
example is van Damme and Weibull’s (1998) model of “mutations driven by
control costs”, which has mutation rates determined by individual mistake
probabilities, which players can control at some cost. State-dependent muta-
tions are thus based on an economically justiﬁed model here, in the manner
suggested by Bergin and Lipman (1996). But whilst both of these papers
model important ways in which strategy adoption might be costly, neither
captures the idea that strategy change is costly compared to the (cost-free)
status quo. The switching costs postulated in this paper, by contrast, draw
attention to the learning and implementation costs incurred when a player
switches to a new strategy - a plausible source of individual-level inertia.
3 Uniform Mutations
As has been seen, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in Hawk-Dove
games is that in mixed strategies. However, despite this “attractiveness” of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium in Hawk-Dove games, existing evolutionary
models have not found it to be selected robustly as a long-run equilibrium.
Indeed, Hawk-Dove games are seen by some as “the most problematic type
of game”6. Applying their model to Hawk-Dove games, Kandori, Mailath,
and Rob (1993) do derive a result selecting the mixed-strategy equilibrium in
the long run, but only under a certain condition on the selection dynamics.7
In eﬀect, adjustment must be suﬃciently slow to rule out overshooting of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium. This condition seems somewhat ad hoc, and
so this section explores whether introducing switching costs into the model
can serve to robustify the result, as the ﬁndings of Norman (2003a) suggest
it might. In fact, analysis reveals that it cannot do so to any satisfactory
degree, a similar condition being required on the deterministic dynamic for
long-run selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium to hold in the presence
of switching costs as in their absence. Whilst the condition on the selec-
tion dynamics is weaker under switching costs, the long-run selection of the
mixed-strategy equilibrium is also diluted somewhat, given the concomitant
6Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), p. 67.
7Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) derive a similar result for a suﬃciently large pop-
ulation in their model.
6creation of competing mixed absorbing states. These ﬁndings highlight the
limitations in the ﬁxed-switching cost, state-independent mutations model
employed.
3.1 The Model
To begin with then, the uniform mutation rate model of Norman (2003a) is
employed. This is essentially the Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) model
in the presence of a switching cost c of changing strategies at the individual
player level. Thus, there is a ﬁnite number N (N an even number) of players
who are repeatedly matched to play the symmetric 2£2 stage game deﬁned







and who adjust their behaviour over time. Actions are taken in discrete
time, t = 1;2;:::, each player choosing his pure strategy for a period t at
the beginning of that period. The number zt of players playing strategy 1
at time t deﬁnes the state of the dynamical system, the state space being













(N ¡ z ¡ 1)
(N ¡ 1)
a22 (3)
These become expected payoﬀs under the assumption that players are my-
opic.
KMR’s “Darwinian” selection dynamics - under which better strategies
are better represented in the population in the next period - are once again
modiﬁed to include a ﬁxed switching cost c, incurred whenever a player
switches strategies.
Deﬁnition 1 A 1-incumbent (resp. 2-incumbent) in period t is a player
who was a 1-strategist (resp. 2-strategist) in period t ¡ 1.




a21 ¡ c a22 ¡ c
¸
(4)
8See KMR (1993), p. 37, for models of matching which generate these payoﬀs. Note









for 1-incumbents and 2-incumbents, respectively.
Given the presence of this switching cost, KMR’s underlying determin-
istic dynamic,
zt+1 = b(zt) (6)
now has the “modiﬁed Darwinian” property:9;10




strictly negative iﬀ ¼1(z) < ¼2(z) ¡ c
nonnegative iﬀ ¼1(z) ¸ ¼2(z) ¡ c
nonpositive iﬀ ¼1(z) ¡ c · ¼2(z)




for z 6= 0;N.
(7)
Or, more succinctly,11




strictly negative iﬀ ¼1(z) ¡ ¼2(z) < ¡c
0 iﬀ ¡ c · ¼1(z) ¡ ¼2(z) · c




for z 6= 0;N. (8)
The model is now made stochastic by introducing some noise (“muta-
tions”) into the system. Following KMR, it is assumed that each player’s
strategy “ﬂips” with probability " in each period (i.i.d. across players and
over time).12 This yields the nonlinear stochastic diﬀerence equation
zt+1 = b(zt) + xt ¡ yt, (9)
where xt and yt have the binomial distributions:
xt » Bin(N ¡ b(zt);") and yt » Bin(b(zt);")
The dynamical system in equation (9) deﬁnes a Markov chain on the ﬁnite
state space Z = f0;1;:::Ng. P" = [pij] is the Markov matrix, with the
transition probabilities given by
pij = Pr(zt+1 = j j zt = i) (10)
9The strict and weak inequalities are assigned according to the assumption that indif-
ference leads to inertia at the individual level. This assumption is unimportant for the
results.
10For the extreme states, 0 and N, it is assumed that b(0) > 0 iﬀ ¼1(0)¡c > ¼2(0), and
b(0) = 0 iﬀ ¼1(0) ¡ c · ¼2(0). Similarly, b(N) < N iﬀ ¼1(N) < ¼2(N) ¡ c, and b(N) = N
iﬀ ¼1(N) ¸ ¼2(N) ¡ c.
11For the extreme states, similarly, b(0) > 0 iﬀ ¼1(0) ¡ ¼2(0) > c,and b(0) = 0 iﬀ
¼1(0)¡¼2(0) · c; b(N) < N iﬀ ¼2(N)¡¼1(N) > c, and b(N) = N iﬀ ¼2(N)¡¼1(N) · c.
12The usual stories of “experimentation” or of players dying (with probability 2") and
being replaced by ignorant newcomers may be appealed to. For example, see KMR (1993),
pp. 38-9.
8All elements in the matrix P" are strictly positive under the above assump-
tions.
The long-run behaviour of the Markov chain in equation (9) is captured
by the stationarity equations ¹"P" = ¹", the solution of which is the dis-
tribution ¹" (over states) that is stationary under P". However, it is not
immediately clear whether this solution is unique. If it is not, long-run be-
haviour will be sensitive to initial conditions, so that the path dependence
of deterministic models remains. However, for an ergodic Markov process,
the stationarity equations will have a unique solution and the long-run be-
haviour embodied in ¹" will be independent of initial conditions. The unique
invariant distribution ¹" may then be used to explore the equilibrium se-
lection issue by providing information on whether some outcomes are much
more likely than others. Indeed, ¹" can be interpreted as the proportion of
time that the society spends in each state in the long run.
Lemma 1 An irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain is ergodic.
This is a standard result - see, for instance, Theorem 11.2 of Stokey, Lucas,
and Prescott (1989).
Proposition 1 The adaptive response dynamic deﬁned by the transition
probabilities pij in equation (10) is an irreducible, aperiodic Markov process
on the ﬁnite state space Z. Consequently, it has a unique invariant (ergodic)
distribution ¹".
Proof. Since all elements in the Markov matrix P" are strictly positive, i.e.
any state is accessible from any other state in a single period, it follows that
the process is irreducible. Moreover, since in every state there is a positive
probability of the system remaining in that state in the next period, the
process is aperiodic. Lemma 1 then implies that the process has a unique
invariant distribution.
The stage game Each time the players are matched to play the game
Λ in (1), they will play a symmetric “Hawk-Dove” game. The class of
symmetric Hawk-Dove games is the set of all games satisfying the conditions
a11 < a21 and a22 < a12. This class of games has two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, (1;2) and (2;1), and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium which
has strategy 1 being played with probability
½ =
a22 ¡ a12
(a22 ¡ a12) + (a11 ¡ a21)
There is thus a set of three Nash equilibria, ΘNE = f(1;2);(2;1);(½;½)g,
with no apparent way of selecting between them - the classic game-theoretic
problem of multiple equilibria. However, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is
9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
















Figure 1: Maynard Smith’s (1982) “Hawk-Dove” game
immediately somewhat more appealing than the two pure-strategy equilib-
ria, by virtue of being the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.13
Example 1 Maynard Smith’s (1982) “Hawk-Dove” game in ﬁgure 1 mod-
elled two animals contesting a resource worth V > 0. In this game’s original
biological context, the payoﬀs are interpreted as the incremental ﬁtnesses that
accrue to the two animals, where “ﬁtness” is the property of an animal that
determines its likelihood of survival/reproduction. Each animal can choose
to be aggressive (playing Hawk) or to acquiesce (playing Dove). If one ani-
mal plays Hawk and the other animal plays Dove, then the aggressive animal
takes the whole resource and the acquiescent animal gets nothing. If, mean-
while, both animals choose the same pure strategy, then each is equally likely
to get the resource, but if the strategy played is Hawk, the resulting con-
ﬂict causes each to pay a cost of K ¸ V . The game has two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria, (Hawk;Dove) and (Dove;Hawk), but a unique symmetric





This sort of game has obvious applications to international conﬂicts, and
the “Hawk-Dove” terminology is widely used in the international relations
literature.
13It is worth noting that the principal reﬁnement of deterministic evolutionary game
theory, namely evolutionary stability, selects the mixed-strategy equilibrium as the unique
evolutionarily stable strategy.
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(b(z) ¡ z) > 0 (b(z) ¡ z) < 0
Figure 2: KMR (1993) model: Hawk-Dove games
3.2 Analysis
3.2.1 The KMR theorem












z + a22 (12)
Note that the ¼2 (z) line will be steeper than the ¼1 (z) line if and only if
a11 ¡ a21 < a12 ¡ a22
and that this holds necessarily for Hawk-Dove games given that a11 < a21
and a22 < a12.14 Moreover, these same two deﬁning conditions of Hawk-
Dove games imply that ¼2(z) < ¼1(z) for z = 0 and that ¼2(z) > ¼1(z) for
z = N (as is clear from equations (2) and (3)), so that there will certainly
exist a value z¤ 2 Z where the two average payoﬀ lines cross (though this
z¤ need not, of course, be an integer). This corresponds to the mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the Hawk-Dove stage game, which puts probability




a11¡a21+a22¡a12 on strategy 1.15 It is straightforward to solve for the
value of z¤:
0 = ¼1(z¤) ¡ ¼2(z¤)
(2),(3)
=) z¤ =
N(a22 ¡ a12) + a11 ¡ a22
µ
, (13)
where µ = (a11 ¡ a21 + a22 ¡ a12) is the sum of the normalised stage game
payoﬀs, a1 = a11 ¡ a21 and a2 = a22 ¡ a12.
Looking at ﬁgure 2, it is clear that the mixed-strategy equilibrium of
Hawk-Dove games is “attractive” in the sense that the deterministic dy-
namic points towards z¤ in all states. In the coordination game setting of
KMR (1993) and Norman (2003a), by contrast, the conﬁguration of the two
average payoﬀ lines was reversed, so that the average payoﬀ line for strat-
egy 1 was steeper than that for strategy 2, and the deterministic dynamic
pointed away from the mixed-strategy equilibrium z¤ in any given state.16
The “attractiveness” of z¤ in the Hawk-Dove setting accords with the fact
that the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of such games is that in mixed
strategies.
In order to investigate whether this “attractiveness” of the mixed-strategy
equilibrium leads it to be selected as the long-run equilibrium of the model,
use is made of Young’s (1993) method17 for computing the stochastically sta-
ble states of a regular18 perturbed Markov process. This method is based
on the notion of rooted trees constructed on the set of the recurrent class(es)
E1, E2, :::, EK of the unperturbed process P0. For a given pair of (distinct)
15In this population context, the exact analogue of the stage game mixed-strategy equi-
librium is the state ½N (which again need not be an integer) where a fraction ½ of all
players are playing strategy 1. Note that z
¤ will not be exactly equal to ½N because
1-incumbents and 2-incumbents face slightly diﬀerent strategy distributions due to the
ﬁniteness of the population. The diﬀerence between z
¤ and ½N does, however, vanish as
the population size becomes large.
16Note that the only other possible conﬁguration of the two average payoﬀ lines in
ﬁgure 2 is for the lines not to cross within the state space. This then corresponds to
the remaining class of symmetric 2 £ 2 games - that where there is a dominant strategy
(the strategy whose average payoﬀ line lies entirely above that of the other strategy).
Question-beggingly high switching costs are required to overthrow the dominant-strategy
equilibrium as the unique long-run equilibrium of this class of games.
17See Young (1998), section 3.4, for more detail and illustrative examples.
18Let P
" be a Markov process on Z for each " in some interval [0;"
¤]. P
" is described
as a regular perturbed Markov process if P
" is irreducible for every " 2 (0;"
¤], and for




















"r(i;j) < 1 for some r(i;j) ¸ 0.
The real number r(i;j) is called the resistance of the transition i ! j. Note that transitions
that can occur under P
0 have zero resistance (i.e. p
0
ij > 0 if and only if r(i;j) = 0).
12recurrent classes Ei and Ej, an ij-path is a sequence of states that begins in
Ei and ends in Ej. The resistance of this path is then the number of muta-
tions required to transit from recurrent class Ei to recurrent class Ej along
this path, and the minimum resistance over all possible ij-paths is denoted
rij.19 Construct a complete directed graph with K vertices (one for each
recurrent class), and weight each directed edge i ! j with the appropriate
minimum resistance rij. A tree rooted at a particular recurrent class Ej’s
vertex j (a j-tree) is then a set of (K ¡1) directed edges such that there is a
unique directed path in the tree to j from every vertex (i.e. recurrent class)
other than j. The resistance of a rooted tree T is the sum of the resistances
rij on T’s (K ¡ 1) edges, and the minimum resistance over all trees rooted
at j is called the stochastic potential °j of the recurrent class Ej.




The selection criterion of stochastic stability identiﬁes which outcome(s) re-
ceive positive weight in the ergodic distribution as the amount of noise tends
to zero. Intuitively, stochastically stable states are those that are most likely
to be observed over the long run when noise is small, and they are thus some-
times referred to as the long-run equilibria of a system.
Lemma 2 (Young (1993)) If P" is a regular perturbed Markov process,
and ¹" is its unique stationary distribution for each " > 0, then lim"!0 ¹"(z) =
¹0 exists, and the limiting distribution ¹0 is a stationary distribution of the
unperturbed process P0. The stochastically stable states are precisely those
states contained in the recurrent class(es) of P0 having minimum stochastic
potential.
The intuition for this result is that, for a small and positive noise level ", the
process is most likely to follow paths leading towards the recurrent classes
having minimum potential.
Returning to the application at hand, for the coordination games of KMR
(1993), the set of recurrent classes of the unperturbed process was invari-
ant under the admitted class of “Darwinian” selection dynamics. Moreover,
from any given state the underlying deterministic dynamic pointed in the
direction of one and only one absorbing state. For states below the mixed-
strategy equilibrium (z < z¤), the deterministic dynamic pointed towards
the absorbing state 0, whilst for states above the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium (z > z¤), it pointed towards the absorbing state N. In no state did
the deterministic dynamic point towards the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Thus, the speed of the dynamic was unimportant for long-run equilibrium;
19Note that other evolutionary models (such as KMR) employ the analogous notion of
the cost of a transition path, rather than the resistance.
13immediate best-response by all players would transport the system to the
relevant extreme state within one period, but the same state would eventu-
ally be reached if the dynamic speciﬁed that only one player reviewed his
strategy each period.
In Hawk-Dove games, by contrast, the deterministic dynamic in any
given state points in the direction of a multitude of possible recurrent classes.
This is because the set of recurrent classes of the unperturbed process
changes according to the precise speciﬁcation of the selection dynamic. The
speed of adjustment thus becomes crucially important for both short- to
medium- and long-run equilibrium. To illustrate, consider what happens if
the speed of adjustment is as fast as it could possibly be - i.e. if the deter-
ministic dynamic is the simultaneous-review best-response dynamic BN(z),
under which all players best-respond every period. In this case, the unper-
turbed process P0 has one recurrent class, f0;Ng.20 In any state z 2 [0;z¤),
all players’ best response is to play strategy 1 (BN(z) = N), so that the
system jumps to state N in the next period. In any state z 2 (z¤;N], mean-
while, all players’ best response is to play strategy 2 (BN(z) = 0), so that
the system jumps to state 0 in the next period. Thus, once the recurrent
class f0;Ng has been entered, the system oscillates between the two extreme
states from one period to the next. Since this is the only recurrent class, it is
(trivially) the recurrent class with minimum stochastic potential once noise
is introduced, and (by Lemma 2, page 13) is thus selected with probability
one by the long-run invariant distribution as " ! 0 (with each of states 0
and N receiving probability 1
2).
The results are very diﬀerent, however, if the speed of adjustment is as
slow as it could possibly be under KMR’s “Darwinian” dynamics - i.e. if the
deterministic dynamic is the single-revisions best-response dynamic B1(z),
under which only one player best-responds each period, the rest retaining
their previous strategy. In this case, the mixed-strategy equilibrium (or,
more precisely, its neighbouring integers) is selected in the long run. There
is again just one recurrent class, but this time it is the set f®;¯g of integers
surrounding the mixed-strategy equilibrium z¤. For z 2 [0;z¤), B1(z) =
z+1, whilst for z 2 (z¤;N], B1(z) = z¡1. Thus, B1(®) = ¯ and B1(¯) = ®,
so that f®;¯g is the unique recurrent class which, once entered, sees the
system oscillate between the states ® and ¯ from one period to the next.
Another trivial application of Lemma 2 shows that the limit distribution of
the perturbed process puts probability 1
2 on each of the states ® and ¯.
In fact, the selection dynamic does not have to be as slow as this “one-
step” single-revisions dynamic in order to deliver the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium as the unique long-run equilibrium. KMR’s (1993) Theorem 5 provides
a condition on the selection dynamics which, if satisﬁed, ensures the long-
20In the unlikely event that the mixed-strategy equilibrium z
¤ happens to be an integer,
it will also form a (singleton) recurrent class, but an extremely unstable one.
14run selection of f®;¯g as above. Given a mixed-strategy equilibrium that
places probability ½ on strategy 1 being played, KMR say that b(z) is a
contraction relative to ½N21 if
djb(z) ¡ ½Nje · djz ¡ ½Nje for all z, (14)
with the inequality holding strictly if ½N 2 Z or djz ¡½Nje ¸ 2. If b(z) is a
contraction relative to ½N, and if N is suﬃciently large that 1 · ½N · N¡1,
then the limit distribution mimics the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the way
that it did for the one-step dynamic above.
By constraining the selection dynamic to behave in this way, the mixed-
strategy equilibrium becomes inevitable, but it is not clear whether the
“contraction” condition is a reasonable constraint to impose. For KMR,
the condition is best viewed as an assumption on the length of a period:
periods are suﬃciently short that only a small fraction of the population
can adjust. For example, it is satisﬁed by the above one-step dynamic.
However, it is not satisﬁed by a “two-step” dynamic, nor indeed by any
“n-step” dynamic where n > 1; a one-step dynamic is required to keep the
system at the mixed-strategy equilibrium once it is reached, and any faster
n-step dynamic will not select the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the long
run. An unperturbed two-step best-response dynamic would have two re-
current classes, f(¯ ¡ 1);®g and f¯;(® + 1)g, each of which would receive
probability 1
2 under the limit distribution of the perturbed process. Sim-
ilarly, an unperturbed three-step best-response dynamic would have three
recurrent classes, f(¯ ¡ 2);®g, f(¯ ¡ 1);(® + 1)g and f¯;(® + 2)g, each of
which would receive probability 1
3 under the limit distribution of the per-
turbed process. This indeterminacy of the n-step dynamic will grow with
n (giving n equally likely recurrent classes), reaching a maximum when
n = minf®;N ¡ ¯g; at this point, the limits of the state space start to
reduce the number of recurrent classes, until it eventually falls to 1 again
under the simultaneous-review best-response dynamic. These considerations
reveal the stringent requirements imposed by KMR’s “contraction” condi-
tion, and suggest the focality of the mixed-strategy equilibrium in stochastic
evolutionary Hawk-Dove games to be far from robust.
Matters are helped little by moving to a dynamic where a constant frac-
tion of those wishing to switch strategies may do so each period. What the
“contraction” condition literally requires is that a suﬃciently small fraction
of those players whose current best response is to switch strategies actually
do so, and that this fraction shrink the closer is the current state to the
mixed-strategy equilibrium ½N. Thus, with a dynamic that speciﬁes a con-
stant fraction of would-be strategy-switchers as adjusting each period, the
21Recall that ½N is the exact mixed-strategy equilibrium analogue, by contrast with the
close approximation z
¤ delivered by players ignoring their own play when forming beliefs
(see note 15, page 12).
15fraction required to hold the system around the mixed-strategy equilibrium
once reached (i.e. 1=maxf®;N ¡ ¯g) provides a (very low) upper bound on
the permissible speed of review for the whole process, if the mixed-strategy
equilibrium is to be selected in the long run. Indeed, the fastest possible
review here occurs when ® = N ¡ ¯ ¼ N
2 , so that the permitted reviewing
fraction is 2
N.
All in all, one is left either with the requirement of very slow review
for selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, or with trying to provide a
foundation for a dynamic which sees the fraction of adjusting players fall
(suﬃciently quickly) as the system approaches the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium. The natural question to arise at this point, in view of the ﬁndings of
Norman (2003a), is whether the introduction of switching costs to strategy
changes could serve to strengthen the mixed-strategy equilibrium of Hawk-
Dove games, and thus robustify its selection as the long-run equilibrium.
3.2.2 Introducing inertia
As in Norman (2003a), the introduction of switching costs into the model
creates a region of new mixed absorbing states, born of player inertia when
the switching cost outweighs any potential payoﬀ gain from a strategy
change.
Proposition 2 In the presence of a switching cost c > 0, there exists a
multiplicity of mixed absorbing states22 of the unperturbed process P0 in
addition to the set of recurrent classes present when c = 0.
Proof. The modiﬁed Darwinian property of the selection dynamics
in equation (8) says that there is a range of the average payoﬀ diﬀerence
between the two strategies, (¼1(z) ¡ ¼2(z)) 2 [¡c;c], for which (b(z)¡z) = 0.
Since the average payoﬀ lines in ﬁgure 2 will certainly cross at some z¤ 2 Z
(as was shown above), it follows that there will be a range of z, [zL;zH] 2 Z,
for which (b(z)¡z) = 0. Now, it is clear from the deterministic dynamic in
equation (6) that any state for which (b(z)¡z) = 0 is an absorbing state of
the unperturbed process P0 (since then zt+1 = zt for " = 0). Thus, there
is a range of z 2 fZn0;Ng, each (integer) element of which is a (mixed)
absorbing state.
Deﬁnition 4 Given equation (8), the lower limit zL of the range of z for
22A mixed state is one where both strategies are being played by some strictly positive
number of players (as opposed to the two pure states, 0 and N). This has also been
termed a polymorphic proﬁle(by contrast with a monomorphic proﬁle) in the literature
(e.g. Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996)).
16which (b(z) ¡ z) = 0 is deﬁned as
c = ¼1(zL) ¡ ¼2(zL)
(2),(3)
=) zL =
N(a22 ¡ a12 + c) + a11 ¡ a22 ¡ c
µ
, (15)
whilst the upper limit zH is deﬁned as
¡c = ¼1(zH) ¡ ¼2(zH)
(2),(3)
=) zH =
N(a22 ¡ a12 ¡ c) + a11 ¡ a22 + c
µ
(16)
Deﬁnition 5 As in KMR (1993), the integers around z¤ are deﬁned as
® = minfz 2 Z j ¼2(z) > ¼1(z)g = dz¤e; and
¯ = maxfz 2 Z j ¼2(z) < ¼1(z)g = bz¤c
Similarly, the integers around zL are deﬁned as
®L = minfz 2 Z j ¼1(z) ¡ ¼2(z) < cg = dzLe; and
¯L = maxfz 2 Z j ¼1(z) ¡ ¼2(z) > cg = bzLc
whilst those around zH are deﬁned as
®H = minfz 2 Z j ¼1(z) ¡ ¼2(z) < ¡cg = dzHe; and
¯H = maxfz 2 Z j ¼1(z) ¡ ¼2(z) > ¡cg = bzHc
Figure 2 is thus modiﬁed to yield ﬁgure 3. The set EM of new mixed
absorbing states is then straightforwardly characterised as:
EM = f®L;®L + 1;:::;¯;®;:::;®H;¯Hg
= f®L + jg; j = 0;1;:::;(¯H ¡ ®L) (17)
The number m of these mixed absorbing states is clearly given by
m = ¯H ¡ ®L + 1
= ¯H ¡ ¯L = ®H ¡ ®L (18)
Deﬁning ³L = ®L ¡ zL and ³H = ®H ¡ zH, m can then be expressed as a
function of the parameters of the model:




+ (³H ¡ ³L) (19)
Since µ < 0 for Hawk-Dove games, the number of mixed absorbing states m
is clearly increasing in N and c, but decreasing in the absolute value of the
sum of the normalised stage game payoﬀs µ.
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(b(z) ¡ z) > 0 (b(z) ¡ z) = 0 (b(z) ¡ z) < 0
Figure 3: KMR Hawk-Dove games with switching costs
The existence of the new mixed absorbing states is independent of the
precise selection dynamic employed, and thus hints at a new stability lacking
in the above inertialess model. In fact, however, in order for any of the new
mixed absorbing states to be selected as long-run equilibria, a “contraction”
condition (albeit slightly modiﬁed) must once again be imposed on the se-
lection dynamics. Moreover, the KMR result is in fact weakened in some
sense by the introduction of switching costs, the mixed-strategy equilibrium
losing its unique focality.
Deﬁnition 6 Given a mixed-strategy equilibrium that places probability ½
on strategy 1 being played, say that b(z) is a contraction relative to EM if
djb(z) ¡ ½Nje · djz ¡ ½Nje for all z, (20)
with the inequality holding strictly if djz ¡ ½Nje > (1
2m) (or djz ¡ ½Nje >
(1
2m + 1) for m odd).
Proposition 3 If b(z) is a contraction relative to EM, then the limit distri-
bution of the perturbed Hawk-Dove game in the presence of a ﬁxed switching
cost c puts probability 1
m on each of the m mixed absorbing states.
Proof. The mixed absorbing states, EM, constitute the only recurrent
classes of the unperturbed process when the “modiﬁed contraction” condi-
tion of Deﬁnition 6 is satisﬁed. Each mixed absorbing state has an essentially
identical most eﬃcient (i.e., most probable) j-tree constituted by one-step
jumps between absorbing states (see ﬁgure 4), each such jump requiring one
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(a) Most eﬃcient 3-tree
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(b) Most eﬃcient 4-tree
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(c) Most eﬃcient 5-tree
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Figure 4: Most eﬃcient j-trees, m = 3
mutation. All of the mixed absorbing states thus have the same stochastic
potential, so that they are all selected as equally likely long-run equilibria
by Lemma 2 (page 13).
The only strengthening of the result to emerge with the addition of
switching costs is that obtained by the weakening of the “contraction” con-
dition in Deﬁnition 6; the inequality in equation (20) is now only required
to hold strictly if the system currently lies outside the EM region (compare
equation (14), page 15). This weakening is possible because the determin-
istic dynamic does not act within the EM region, so that it is only required
to deliver the system into the EM region, rather than all the way to the
mixed-strategy equilibrium as before. As a result, a wider class of selection
dynamics will now select the EM states than would have selected the mixed-
strategy equilibrium in the absence of inertia. Thus, for example, if there is
a region of ﬁve mixed absorbing states in the presence of a given switching
cost c, then a six-step dynamic satisﬁes the “modiﬁed contraction” condition
and will deliver the selection results of Proposition 3. This, however, seems
a hollow victory in the wake of the indeterminacy of the Proposition.
3.3 Discussion
Thus, contrary to initial expectation, the presence of switching cost-driven
inertia in the evolutionary Hawk-Dove game studied does not serve to ro-
19bustify the long-run selection of the “attractive” mixed-strategy equilibrium
to any satisfactory degree. The direct eﬀect of the inertia is conﬁned to the
region of the state space taken up by the new mixed absorbing states, so
that a KMR-like “contraction” condition must be placed on the selection
dynamics in order for convergence to that region to take place. The pres-
ence of the mixed absorbing states does serve to weaken the requirements
of the “contraction” condition somewhat, but it also serves to dilute the
focality of the mixed-strategy equilibrium by providing a number of equally
attractive alternative equilibria.
These ﬁndings may signal that the KMR theorem is as strong a selection
result as it is possible to derive for the mixed-strategy equilibrium here, and
- in combination with the ﬁndings of Norman (2003a) - that the presence of
switching costs cannot signiﬁcantly aﬀect long-run equilibrium. More likely,
however, is that it points up the limitations of the model employed so far. In
particular, there are two main unrealistic features of the model that may be
distorting the results or hiding additional eﬀects: the fact that the switching
cost is uniform (across players) and ﬁxed (over time); and the fact that the
probability of mutation is uniform across states. Both problems can be
addressed using a model of state-dependent mutations driven by stochastic
switching costs, to which attention is now turned.
4 State-Dependent Mutations
Whilst it is highly realistic that individual players will face switching costs
of changing their strategies, it has been argued that it is far less realistic
that there will be a single time-invariant switching cost that is the same
across all players, as was the case with c in the above KMR-style model.
Moreover, the model is clearly subject to the Bergin and Lipman (1996)
critique of models with state-independent mutations, the mutation rate "
remaining constant across states. Since mutations may be chosen such that
any invariant distribution of the unperturbed process is the limiting er-
godic distribution of a perturbed process, Bergin and Lipman argue that
state-independent mutations are arbitrary, and that an economically justi-
ﬁed model of state-dependent mutations should instead be employed.
Thus, in this section, the assumption of a ﬁxed switching cost is dropped,
and c is instead allowed to be stochastic, determined as the realisation of a
random variable C. Each individual player takes a draw from C each period
to determine his switching cost for that period, yielding the realistic feature
of idiosyncratic, time-varying switching costs. Hence, this sort of stochas-
tic switching costs model explicitly incorporates player heterogeneity, with
players varying in their switching costs according to abilities, situations,
priorities and so on. Indeed, it has parallels with the Myatt and Wallace
(1998) model of adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents. The move to stochas-
20tic switching costs also has the potential to address the Bergin and Lipman
(1996) critique by endogenising the mutation rate. The stochastic switching
costs can provide the “error” necessary to yield an ergodic Markov chain,
with this “error” now being interpreted as players behaving diﬀerently to
what one would expect from the cost-less payoﬀ matrix Λ in equation (1).
However, if - as the intuition for switching costs would at ﬁrst suggest -
the support of the random variable C were to be restricted to the positive
real line R+, then the resulting Markov process would not be irreducible;
“mutations” against the ﬂow of the deterministic dynamic would have zero
probability since, with a positive switching cost, no player will ever switch
away from the strategy which currently has the higher expected payoﬀ.23 A
reducible Markov chain remains subject to path-dependence, and does not
yield an ergodic long-run distribution. To attain this, the state-independent
mutation rate " of the earlier chapters could be re-introduced, but this seems
ad hoc and defeatist. Instead, the support of the switching cost random vari-
able C could be extended to the whole real line R, allowing the possibility
of switching beneﬁts. The existence of switching beneﬁts in some players,
grounded for example in an urge for creativity or nonconformity, is a re-
alistic feature to incorporate within the model, and can be kept relatively
improbable by assuming that C is distributed with positive mean. This will
suﬃce to deliver an irreducible Markov chain - all states now being accessi-
ble from all others - and thus the desired ergodic long-run distribution over
states.
Long-run selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium is found to hold
in the stochastic switching costs model under the single-revisions dynamic,
which assumes that a single randomly selected member of the population
has the opportunity to revise his strategy at the end of each period. How-
ever, this was to be expected, given that the “one-step” single-revisions
dynamic satisﬁes both of the “contraction” conditions from the previous
section. Generality thus requires the model to be extended to a KMR-style
simultaneous-revisions framework, in which every player simultaneously has
the opportunity to review his strategy each period. This allows the rate at
which players review their strategies to be endogenised, so that the prob-
lems encountered in section 3 are overcome, and long-run convergence to the
mixed-strategy equilibrium can be given a robust theoretical foundation. It
turns out that there exists a threshold mean switching cost, above which
the mixed-strategy equilibrium is selected in the long run for a wide class of
switching cost distributions.
23This observation illustrates well the Bergin and Lipman (1996) criticism of the ar-
bitrariness of state-independent mutations: there might be no reason to expect certain
sorts of mutations under certain circumstances, and to ignore this is to assume away path-
dependence when it may be an essential feature of the real-life process. The model here
seeks to avoid this problem by providing an economically justiﬁed model of mutations
which generates irreducibility.
214.1 The Model
The basic KMR structure of a ﬁnite population of N players repeatedly
playing the 2 £ 2 game Λ (equation (1)) is retained, with associated cost-
adjusted payoﬀ matrices Λ1 and Λ2 (equations (4) and (5)). The ﬁrst major
change to the model is that the switching cost c in any given period is now
determined for each player individually as an independent and identically
distributed draw from the switching cost random variable C, which is as-
sumed to have a cumulative distribution function (cdf) F with a nonnegative
mean ¯ c ¸ 0 and variance ¾2. This is a natural, general representation of
diﬀering switching costs across players, the positive mean focusing attention
on switching costs but the inﬁnite support delivering a small probability of
switching beneﬁts.
The expected payoﬀs are as they were in section 3 (see equations (2)
and (3), page 7). Deﬁne $1(z) = ¼1(z)¡¼2(z), and $2(z) = ¼2(z)¡¼1(z),
to be the expected payoﬀ gains at stake from strategy switches in state z.
Clearly a 1-incumbent will switch to being a 2-strategist if and only if
$2(z) > c
whilst a 2-incumbent will switch to being a 1-strategist if and only if
$1(z) > c
Deﬁning st
l to be the strategy of player l in period t, the switching prob-
abilities conditional on player l having been selected for review are then
immediate:
Pr(st+1
l = 2 j st
l = 1) = F ($2(z ¡ 1))
Pr(st+1
l = 1 j st
l = 2) = F ($1(z))
The probability of a selected 2-incumbent switching to strategy 1 in a given
state is illustrated in ﬁgure 5 (f(¢) representing the switching cost random
variable C’s probability density function (pdf)).24
The second major change to the KMR-style model of section 3 is in
the selection dynamic employed. In this more complicated setting, it is
desirable for the sake of mathematical convenience to focus attention on
the best-response dynamic B(z) - where players play their best response to
current strategy frequencies - rather than KMR’s more general “Darwinian”
dynamic b(z). This simpliﬁes the analysis and also serves to isolate the eﬀect
of inertia on the system’s review rate, without the distraction of having
other forms of bounded rationality at work. The eﬀect of the selection
dynamic can still be analysed in this setting by comparing the extreme cases
24Whilst the pdf depicted in ﬁgure 5 is a Normal density, f(¢) is a general pdf in the
model, and thus can take any form.
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Figure 5: The switching cost C’s pdf
of the simultaneous-revisions dynamic of KMR (1993) and others, and the
“one-step” single-revisions dynamic favoured by Binmore and Samuelson
(1997), Blume (1999), and Myatt and Wallace (1998). Under the “one-
step” dynamic, a single randomly selected member of the population has
the opportunity to revise his strategy at the end of each period. Given his
realised value of c, this player observes the strategy distribution among the
incumbent population and selects a best response to this frequency.25 In the
simultaneous-revisions model by contrast, each player has this opportunity
to revise his strategy each period. Evolution can thus proceed far more
rapidly under simultaneous revisions, ceteris paribus.26
4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 Single revisions
In this subsection, use will be made of the “one-step” best-response dy-
namic B1(z), where just one player at a time has the opportunity to revise
his strategy. Given that the reviewing player l is randomly selected, the
probability that he is a 1-incumbent is simply z
N, implying the following
transition probabilities between states.
25An equivalent scenario is the familiar story of player exit and entry, whereby a ran-
domly selected player leaves at the end of each period, and is replaced by another player
with a new draw from C.
26Both the single- and simultaneous-revisions dynamics require the implicit assumption
that the switching cost of an updating individual will have changed since the last revision,
since he must take a fresh draw from C. This is a reasonable assumption when the noise
is small, and thus unproblematic for vanishing heterogeneity results obtained as ¾
2 tends
to zero. More generally, the procedure can be justiﬁed by noting that players are more
likely to revise their strategy whenever their switching costs change.
23Lemma 3 The transition probabilities pij of the Markov matrix P satisfy:
pij =
8
> > > <
















F ($1(i)) j = i + 1
9
> > > =
> > > ;
and are zero elsewhere.
Proof. Given the single-revisions framework, the process cannot move
from state i to j < i ¡ 1 or j > i + 1. A move to state i + 1 requires
that a 2-incumbent be selected for review, and that having been selected his
best response to the current strategy frequency be to switch to strategy 1.
The former occurs with probability (N ¡ i)=N; the latter with probability
F ($1(i)). Similar arguments apply for the cases j = i and j = i ¡ 1.
Proposition 4 The adaptive response dynamic deﬁned by the transition
probabilities pij in Lemma 3 is an irreducible, aperiodic Markov process on
the ﬁnite state space Z. Consequently, it has a unique invariant distribution.
Proof. Since the normal distribution has full support, either strategy may
be chosen by any reviewing player. The process can thus move in either di-
rection from any state i (except the extreme states), as formalised in Lemma
3, so that every state is accessible from all others in ﬁnite time - i.e., the
process is irreducible. Moreover, since in every state there is a positive prob-
ability of the system remaining in that state in the next period, the process
is aperiodic. The process thus has a unique invariant distribution by Lemma
1.
Long-run equilibrium with vanishing heterogeneity In the previous
section, long-run equilibrium results were obtained by analysing the limit
of the ergodic distribution as the probability of mutation " tended to zero.
The analogue in this model, as in the model of Myatt and Wallace (1998),
is vanishing player heterogeneity over switching costs - i.e., taking ¾2 ! 0.
Given the departure from a uniform mutation rate ", the simple Young
stochastic potential technique of Lemma 2 cannot be applied here. Fortu-
nately, Young’s method ﬁts into a wider graph-theoretic approach to the
analysis of the long-run behaviour of perturbed Markov chains. This graph-
theoretic approach is in turn derived from general Markovian theory.27 If "
were known precisely, it would (in theory) be possible to compute the ac-
tual distribution ¹" by simply solving the stationarity equations ¹"P" = ¹".
However, in most applications of interest in economics, the size of the state
27A standard reference for Markovian theory is Karlin and Taylor (1975).
24space would make this a very cumbersome task. This fact led to the im-
porting of the simpliﬁed graph-theoretic techniques of Freidlin and Wentzell
(1984) into the economics discipline by Foster and Young (1990), KMR
(1993), and Young (1993), and the resulting birth of stochastic adjustment
dynamics.
Like the computation of Young’s stochastic potential function, the graph-
theoretic computation of ¹" is based on the notion of rooted trees, but this
time constructed on the whole state space Z rather than merely on the set
of recurrent classes. Speciﬁcally, consider a directed graph whose vertex
set is the state space Z. The edges of this graph form a z-tree (for some
particular z 2 Z) if it consists of jZj ¡ 1 edges and from every vertex i 6= z
there is a unique directed path from i to z. A z-trees’s edges are weighted
with the appropriate Markov transition probabilities pij. Representing any
given directed edge i ! j by the ordered pair of vertices (i;j), a z-tree T
can then be represented as a subset of ordered pairs. Let Tz be the family





Lemma 4 (Freidlin and Wentzell (1984)) Let P be an irreducible Markov
process on a ﬁnite state space Z.28 Its stationary distribution ¹ has the prop-
erty that the probability ¹(z) of each state z is proportional to the sum of









This result allows computation of an exact estimate of a system’s ergodic
distribution ¹" for each " > 0;29 it is not a limiting result as " tends to zero.
The additional analytical power of the Freidlin-Wentzell method in pro-
viding an immediate closed form for the invariant distribution ¹ comes at
the price of the greater complexity inherent in constructing trees on the
whole state space (rather than on the set of recurrent classes, as in Young’s
method30). The number of z-trees to be considered soon becomes pro-
hibitively large as the state space grows. This is where the use of the single-
revisions dynamic becomes useful, since it means that v(z) in equation (21)
takes a very simple form. With only one revision at a time, there is only
28Note that Lemma 2’s condition that P be a regular perturbed process is no longer
required.
29See Young (1998), section 3.4, for illustrative examples.
30Young’s technique in fact follows from that of Freidlin and Wentzell, taking advantage
of uniform mutation rates, and of the zero resistance of paths along the deterministic
dynamic, in order to achieve greater analytical simplicity by simply “counting mutations”
between recurrent classes.
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Figure 6: Unique positively weighted 3-tree, N = 8
one possible positively weighted z-tree for any given state z - that z-tree
involving successive one-step jumps from every state in the direction of z, as
illustrated in ﬁgure 6.31 Any other one-step z-tree violates the requirement















(N ¡ i)F ($1(i))
Y
z<i·N
iF ($2(i ¡ 1)) (22)
The unperturbed process P0 in this model is that where there is no
heterogeneity in switching costs, ¾2 = 0. In this case, the switching cost pdf
(ﬁgure 5, for example) collapses to a point mass on the mean switching cost ¯ c,
and the model becomes that of section 3, with c = ¯ c (see ﬁgure 3, page 18).
Because the selection dynamic is the “one-step” single-revisions dynamic,
the unperturbed process has a set of recurrent classes consisting only of the
mixed absorbing states EM of Proposition 2 (page 16). As usual, the ergodic
distribution will focus all weight on these states as perturbations go to zero,
but to select between them it is necessary to consider their relative weight in
the ergodic distribution. Note that Lemma 4 implies that the relative weight








Following Myatt and Wallace, a state z will be said to dominate another
state z0 for vanishing heterogeneity whenever lim¾2!0
v(z)
v(z0) = 1. If a state
dominates all others in this sense, it is clearly the unique stochastically
stable state of the system.32
31For a proof, see Myatt and Wallace’s (1998) Lemma 3.
32Refer to the deﬁnition of stochastic stability on page 13.
26Deﬁnition 7 A distribution F with mean ¯ y has a likelihood ratio unbounded









1 ¡ F(y + ²)
! 1; 8y > ¯ y;8² > 0
Proposition 5 Assume that the switching cost distribution F has a likeli-
hood ratio unbounded in the tails. Then the unique stochastically stable state
is the integer ® just above the mixed-strategy equilibrium z¤.
Proof. The unique positively weighted ®-tree shares all of its branches
with that of any given state z, except for those branches lying between ®




















assuming without loss of generality that z > ®, and re-indexing the numera-
tor in the second step. As ¾2 ! 0 (i.e., the game approaches that of section
3),33 F ($2(i)) (the probability of a selected 1-incumbent switching to strat-
egy 2) tends to 1 in the limit for i > zH, but to 0 for i · zH.34 Similarly,
F ($1(i)) (the probability of a selected 2-incumbent switching to strategy
1) tends to 1 for i < zL, but to 0 for i ¸ zL. It is thus clear that both the
numerator and the denominator of equation (24) tend to 0 as heterogeneity
vanishes. However, consider the likelihood ratio term (F($2(i))=F($1(i)))
for a given i 2 (zH;z). The numerator of this term tends to 1 in the limit for
any i 2 (zH;N], whilst the denominator tends to 0, so that the limit of the
likelihood ratio term over this range is inﬁnity. Over the range i 2 [®;zH],
meanwhile, both the numerator and the denominator of any given likeli-
hood ratio term tend to 0. But since $2(i) > $1(i) for i > z¤, a suﬃcient
condition for this ratio to tend to inﬁnity as ¾2 ! 0 is that the switching
cost distribution F have a likelihood ratio unbounded in the tails, as de-
ﬁned in Deﬁnition 7. For such switching cost distributions then, all of the
likelihood ratio terms (F($2(i))=F($1(i))) for i 2 [®;z) tend to inﬁnity as
heterogeneity vanishes. Hence, lim¾2!0(v(®)=v(z)) = 1, and ® dominates
all states z 2 (®;N].











33Refer to the unperturbed Hawk-Dove game of ﬁgure 3 (page 18).
34zL and zH are as deﬁned in equations (15) and (16) (page 17), with c = ¯ c.
27And since $1(i) > $2(i) for i < z¤, a suﬃcient condition for this ratio to
tend to inﬁnity as ¾2 ! 0 is that the switching cost distribution F have a
likelihood ratio unbounded in the tails. For such switching cost distributions
then, ® dominates ¯, and hence all states z 2 [0;¯]. It follows that ® is the
unique stochastically stable state.
Remark 1 It should be noted that ® is selected over ¯ here because of the
integer eﬀect of players ignoring their own strategy when calculating current
strategy frequencies. As N ! 1 - and such integer eﬀects disappear - the
limiting ergodic distribution will place equal weight on ® and ¯, which in
any case will both converge on the mixed-strategy equilibrium z¤ as N gets
large.
Thus, for any switching cost distribution satisfying the property of a like-
lihood ratio unbounded in the tails, the “attractive” mixed-strategy equi-
librium of Hawk-Dove games is selected as the long-run equilibrium of the
single-revisions stochastic switching costs model. And a wide variety of rea-
sonable distributions do satisfy this property - for example, the Normal,
Student’s t, exponential, logistic and gamma distributions. Moreover, the
likelihood ratio unbounded in the tails property is a suﬃcient, but not a nec-
essary, condition for the result, so that an even wider class of distributions
is admissible.35
However, this selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium should come as
no surprise, since using the single-revisions dynamic with Hawk-Dove games
is begging the question somewhat; the “one-step” dynamic satisﬁes both
KMR’s “contraction” condition (page 15 above) and the “modiﬁed contrac-
tion” condition of Deﬁnition 6 (page 18). In the next section, the stochastic
switching cost model is extended to the more general simultaneous-revisions
dynamic, and it is shown that in this context convergence to the mixed-
strategy equilibrium can be given more satisfactory foundations.
4.2.2 Simultaneous revisions
The selection dynamic employed in this subsection is the simultaneous-
revisions best-response dynamic BN(z). Under this dynamic, all players
have the opportunity to revise their strategies each period; each player takes
an independent and identically distributed draw from the switching cost ran-
dom variable C, and then best-responds with respect to the current strategy
frequency and his c draw in deciding whether or not to switch strategies.
35Note, however, that the uniform mutation rate " of section 3 does not satisfy this
property.
28Lemma 5 Under the simultaneous-revisions dynamic, the new transition












£ F ($2(i ¡ 1))
i+k¡j (1 ¡ F ($2(i ¡ 1)))
j¡k
£ F ($1(i))
k (1 ¡ F ($1(i)))
N¡i¡k
Proof. There are (minfj;N ¡ ig¡maxfj ¡ i;0g) possible combinations
of strategy switches in a period that will lead the system from state i to
state j, each of which has a number of permutations (essentially relabelling
players) given by the product of the two binomial terms. The product of F
terms is then the probability of each permutation.
Proposition 6 The adaptive response dynamic deﬁned by the transition
probabilities pij in Lemma 5 is an irreducible, aperiodic Markov process on
the ﬁnite state space Z. Consequently, it has a unique invariant distribution.
Proof. Since F has full support, either strategy may be chosen by any
reviewing player. The process can thus move in either direction from any
state i (except the extreme states). Moreover, given that all players have
the opportunity to revise their strategies in each period, the process can
move anything from 0 to N states in one period. Thus, every state is acces-
sible from all others within one period (i.e. every entry pij in the perturbed
Markov matrix P¾2
of Lemma 5 is strictly positive), so that the process is
irreducible. Moreover, since in every state there is a positive probability of
the system remaining in that state in the next period, the process is ape-
riodic. By Lemma 1, the process thus has a unique invariant distribution.
Long-run equilibrium with vanishing heterogeneity As under single
revisions, the unperturbed Markov process P0 under simultaneous revisions
is that where there is no heterogeneity in switching costs, ¾2 = 0. And sim-
ilarly, as the switching cost pdf (ﬁgure 5) collapses to a point mass on the
mean switching cost ¯ c, the model again becomes that of section 3 (see ﬁgure
3, page 18). However, because the selection dynamic is now simultaneous-
revisions best-response, the set of recurrent classes of the unperturbed pro-
cess is widened to include the extreme state cycle f0;Ng in addition to the
mixed absorbing states EM (see page 14). All weight will be focused on these
classes by the ergodic distribution as heterogeneity vanishes, but as before,
limiting relative weights must be considered in order to select between these
candidate equilibria.
29However, this task is considerably less straightforward than under the
single-revisions dynamic. The transition probabilities of Lemma 5 provide
a stark illustration of the potential complexity of the Freidlin-Wentzell ap-
proach to long-run equilibrium analysis. Every branch of every possible
z-tree is weighted by a transition probability pij, and under simultaneous
revisions the number of possible z-trees per state soon becomes prohibitively
large as the state space grows. Fortunately, some simpliﬁcations are avail-
able.
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as ¾2 ! 0. Moreover, for switching cost distributions satisfying the condi-
tion F(¡x) < (1¡F(x)), and with a likelihood ratio unbounded in the tails,
this maximum is achieved at k = maxfj ¡ i;0g.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the result is immediate from Lemma 5, given
that the order of a summation of terms is determined by the highest order
term. To see the second part, consider the eﬀect of increasing k by 1 in
equation (25): (1¡F($2(i¡1)))(1¡F($1(i))) is removed from the expres-
sion, and replaced by the strictly lower F($2(i ¡ 1))F($1(i)) (under the
assumption that F(¡x) < (1¡F(x))). A likelihood ratio unbounded in the
tails is then suﬃcient to guarantee that the maximand in equation (25) is
decreasing in k as ¾2 ! 0.
Intuitively, the minimum value of k is selected in Lemma 6 because this
minimizes the number of strategy switches used to eﬀect a given transition.
Two strategy switches in opposite directions merely cancel each other out,
and two players remaining inert is more probable than two players switch-
ing in opposite directions; hence, anything above the minimum number of
strategy switches serves to reduce a transition path’s probability. This is
a natural feature of a model of evolution under inertia, and indeed a wide
class of distributions satisfy the conditions of the Lemma given a positive
mean. For example, symmetry about ¯ c is suﬃcient (but not necessary) to
ensure that F(¡x) < (1 ¡ F(x)) for ¯ c > 0.
Lemma 7 Under the adaptive response dynamic deﬁned by the transition














z = argmaxT2Tz p(T) is the most probable z-tree for a given state
z.
Proof. Recall that a state z dominates another state z0 for vanishing
heterogeneity whenever lim¾2!0(v(z)=v(z0)) = 1. Recall also from Lemma
4 that v(z) is given by the sum of the likelihoods of all possible z-trees for














(i;j)2T pij is the likelihood of the tree T, which belongs to a
family of z-trees Tz (for a given state z).
Now, lim¾2!0(v(z)=v(z0)) = 1 if and only if v(z) is of higher order than
















dominance is seen to be determined by a comparison of the order of the
likelihood of each state’s highest-order z-tree.37 The likelihoods of the most
probable z-trees are themselves products of the transition probabilities pij
of Lemma 5, each of which is of the order of %ij as ¾2 ! 0 by Lemma 6.
In order to employ Lemma 7 precisely, it is ﬁrst necessary to identify the
most probable z-tree Tmax
z for each state z. This task is far from straight-
forward, and is addressed in Norman (2003b). There it emerges that the
most probable way of escaping a given basin of attraction depends on the
assumed “noise model” - in this case the density of switching costs - but in
general is unlikely to involve either one-step transitions or direct jumps. As
a result, fully operationalizing Lemma 7 is a complex task, feasible only for
particular noise models. However, the long-run equilibrium can be obtained
without knowledge of the precise form of the most probable z-trees.
36In general, for two functions f(x) and g(x), if (f(x)=g(x)) ! 0 as x ! 1, then f is of
smaller order than g, denoted f(x) = o(g(x)). If, on the other hand, limx!1(f(x)=g(x)) ·
constant, then f is of the same order as g, denoted f(x) = O(g(x)).
37This is a key result in graph-theoretic Markovian theory which, for example, underlies
Young’s stochastic potential technique.
31Lemma 8 The most probable z-trees have the following properties:
1. For the most probable 0- and N-trees, Tmax
N and Tmax
0 ,
(a) all branches rooted outside of the EM region (and hence inside
D(f0;Ng)) are those of the deterministic dynamic (whose prob-
abilities tend to 1 as ¾2 ! 0);
(b) the branches rooted in the EM region constitute the (unknown)
most probable way of escaping the region of mixed absorbing states
EM (and thus of entering f0;Ng’s basin of attraction D(f0;Ng)).
2. For the most probable ®- and ¯-trees, Tmax
® and Tmax
¯ ,
(a) all branches rooted inside the EM region are one-step transitions
towards ® for Tmax
® , and towards ¯ for Tmax
¯ ;
(b) the branches rooted outside of the EM region (and hence inside
D(f0;Ng)) constitute the (unknown) most probable way of escap-
ing D(f0;Ng) (i.e., of entering the EM region).
Proof.
1. (a) The transitions of the underlying deterministic dynamic are ob-
viously the most probable transitions available in the limit.
(b) Given 1(a), any state z 2 D(f0;Ng) can be entered from the
EM region, and hence the most probable such escape is selected.
Note that, by an “escape” from the EM region here is meant a
sequence of transitions that provides a directed path from each
mixed absorbing state out of the EM region.
2. (a) The most probable event within the EM region is inertia, but
a z-tree requires a transition rooted in every state. And the
most probable transition from any given mixed absorbing state is
the minimum number of strategy switches in the more probable
direction - i.e., a one-step transition towards the mixed-strategy
equilibrium z¤.
(b) Given 2(a), any mixed absorbing state can be entered from D(f0;Ng),
and hence the most probable such escape is selected.
Proposition 7 Assume that the switching cost distribution F has a likeli-
hood ratio unbounded in the tails. Then, as ¾2 ! 0,
1. the set f0;Ng dominates all states in the ranges (0;zL) and (zH;N);
2. the set f®;¯g dominates all of the other mixed absorbing states.
32Proof.
1. Consider %(N)=%(0), and call this the order ratio for convenience. By
Lemma 8, the most probable 0- and N-trees share all of their branches,
except for those leading from and to each other, 0 ! N and N ! 0.









Since both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio tend to 1
as ¾2 ! 0, it follows that the limit itself is equal to 1, so that neither
state 0 nor N dominates the other. This corresponds with the fact that
the extreme state cycle f0;Ng is a recurrent class of the unperturbed
process.
Consider now the relative weight of the extreme states f0;Ng by com-
parison with states in the regions (0;zL) and (zH;N). Clearly any
z 2 f(0;zL);(zH;N)g lies in f0;Ng’s basin of attraction D(f0;Ng).
And in Tmax
N and Tmax
0 , D(f0;Ng) is entered in the most probable
fashion (by Lemma 8). Moreover, Tmax
N ’s (resp., Tmax
0 ’s) path from z
to N (resp., 0) is clearly more probable than any path from N (resp.,
0) to z. F’s likelihood ratio unbounded in the tails then guarantees
f0;Ng’s dominance over z for vanishing heterogeneity.
2. Consider the order ratio %(®)=%(¯) for the states ® and ¯ that lie
immediately above and below the mixed-strategy equilibrium z¤. By
Lemma 8, the most probable ®- and ¯-trees share all of their branches,
except for those leading from and to each other, ¯ ! ® and ® ! ¯.










Absent integer problems (i.e., as N gets large), %¯® and %®¯ converge
to 0 at the same rate as ¾2 ! 0 (since $1(¯) ¼ $2(®), with equality as
N ! 1). Hence, the limit in equation (26) is a positive constant, and
neither state ® nor ¯ dominates the other for vanishing heterogeneity.
However, both ® and ¯ dominate all of the other mixed absorbing
states for switching cost distributions with a likelihood ratio unbounded
in the tails. To see this, note ﬁrst that any directed path from ® (resp.,
¯) to any other mixed absorbing state zM 2 EMnf®;¯g is strictly less
probable than Tmax
® ’s (resp., Tmax
¯ ’s) one-step-at-a-time directed path
from zM to ® (resp., ¯). Given that the EM region is also entered in
the most probable manner in Tmax
® and Tmax
¯ (by Lemma 8), this is
suﬃcient to guarantee f®;¯g’s dominance over all zM 2 EMnf®;¯g
for vanishing heterogeneity.
33Proposition 8 Assume that the switching cost distribution F has a like-
lihood ratio unbounded in the tails. Then there exists a threshold level of
the mean switching cost, ˆ c, below which the ergodic distribution places all
weight equally on the extreme states 0 and N as ¾2 ! 0, but above which
the mixed-strategy equilibrium states ® and ¯ are the long-run equilibria.
Proof. Recall that if a state dominates all others for vanishing hetero-
geneity, then it is the unique stochastically stable state (or long-run equi-
librium) of the system. Lemma 7 thus implies that if lim¾2!0(%(z)=%(z0)) =
1;8z0 6= z, then z is the unique long-run equilibrium.
By Proposition 7, there are only two possible candidate equilibria for
long-run selection; all weight in the limiting ergodic distribution will be
focused either on the extreme state cycle f0;Ng or on the mixed-strategy
equilibrium states f®;¯g. Hence, a comparison of the relative weights of
® and 0 will suﬃce to indicate which set of states is dominant. Lemma 8

















where Υ0M is the (unknown) sequence of %ij terms (one for each branch)
leading from 0 into the region of mixed absorbing states EM, and ΥM0 is
the (unknown) sequence of %ij terms leading (all of) the mixed absorbing
states into 0’s basin of attraction. The remaining product of %ij terms
represents the one-step transitions towards ® within the EM region of the
most probable ®-tree. Υ0M clearly tends to 0 as ¾2 ! 0, but the ratio
term tends to inﬁnity. To see this, note that every i-term in the numerator
has a corresponding i-term in the denominator ΥM0. And each term in the
numerator is the most probable transition available - i.e., towards z¤ - whilst
the denominator must contain enough transitions away from z¤ to escape
the EM region, by deﬁnition of ΥM0. Hence the numerator of the ratio term
is greater than the denominator, and dominates it as ¾2 ! 0 for switching
cost distributions with a likelihood ratio unbounded in the tails.
Now, raising the mean switching cost ¯ c has a number of eﬀects on equa-
tion (27). First, it increases Υ0M by reducing the number of improbable
failures to switch strategy required to escape f0;Ng’s basin of attraction
(and enter the EM region), and by increasing the likelihood of these fail-
ures. Second, it reduces both the numerator and the denominator of the
ratio term by increasing the number of improbable transitions, and by re-
ducing the likelihood of each of these transitions. The net eﬀect at any given
34point may be either to increase or to decrease the ratio term, but it will never
reduce it below 1, and hence does not threaten the numerator’s dominance
as ¾2 ! 0. Now, when ¯ c = 0, the set of mixed absorbing states is empty,
Υ0M = 0, and f0;Ng is the unique long-run equilibrium. By contrast, when
¯ c = (a21 ¡ a11), the region of mixed absorbing states EM subsumes the
extreme state N, and Υ0M = 1. At this point, the limit in equation (27)
is determined by the limit of the ratio term, and is thus inﬁnity. Hence,
f®;¯g is selected as the unique long-run equilibrium. Since Υ0M is strictly
increasing in ¯ c, it follows that there exists a threshold level of the mean
switching cost, ˆ c 2 (0;(a21 ¡ a11)), above which lim¾2!0(%(®)=%(0)) = 1
and f®;¯g is selected, but below which lim¾2!0(%(®)=%(0)) = 0 and f0;Ng










for switching cost distributions with a likelihood ratio unbounded in the
tails.
Remark 2 Note that ® and ¯ converge to z¤ as N ! 1, so that essentially
the mixed-strategy equilibrium is selected for ¯ c > ˆ c.
Hence, the “attractive” mixed-strategy equilibrium of Hawk-Dove games
emerges as a possible long-run equilibrium of the simultaneous-revisions
stochastic switching costs model. Its selection does, however, require suﬃ-
ciently high mean switching costs, otherwise the extreme state cycle f0;Ng
remains the long-run equilibrium. Essentially, increasing ¯ c has two eﬀects:
it expands the region of mixed absorbing states EM; and it reduces the
probability of any given transition. These eﬀects make the EM region more
likely to be entered and harder to escape - properties which Ellison (2000)
(and indeed the whole literature on basins of attraction) tells us are likely
to deliver stochastic stability.
4.3 Discussion
Thus, in the presence of high enough switching costs, long-run convergence
to the mixed-strategy equilibrium of Hawk-Dove games has a coherent the-
oretical justiﬁcation. This justiﬁcation is not the same as KMR’s “contrac-
tion” condition; indeed, it is more realistic. Whilst the “contraction” con-
dition locks the selection dynamic into an arbitrary pattern that makes the
mixed-strategy equilibrium inevitable, the stochastic switching costs model
provides sound economic reasons why review is likely to proceed in the re-
quired fashion. However, it is not certain to do so, and the probabilistic
nature of the long-run analysis is retained, with long-run selection depend-
ing upon the size of the mean switching cost.
35Because of the complexity of the formal analysis, it is diﬃcult to calculate
the exact size of the threshold mean switching cost ˆ c. It will, however,
certainly be “small” in the sense of being below the question-begging level
of the maximum possible payoﬀ gain from a strategy switch, (a12 ¡ a22)38.
In fact, it is guaranteed to be “smaller” still, since it must be below the
lower of the two maximum possible payoﬀ gains from switching strategies,
ˆ c < (a21 ¡ a11) < (a12 ¡ a22). Moreover, depending on the switching cost
density and population size, ˆ c could be considerably lower than this upper
bound.
Selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium is of course more robust if
one favours the single-revisions dynamic employed in subsection 4.2.1. This
increasingly popular dynamic is appealing for its simplicity, but it can also
be given compelling theoretical foundations. Binmore and Samuelson (1997)
justify the “one-step” dynamic on the basis of a continuous-time framework
in which individual players revise periodically according to an underlying
Poisson process. They note that, in this case, at most one revision will be
observed with high probability during any small period of time.39 However,
it does seem an unsatisfactory feature of the single-revisions model that the
reviewing player is randomly selected, particularly given that under consider-
ation is the very phenomenon of players choosing not to review under certain
conditions - i.e., inertia. The simultaneous-revisions model solves this prob-
lem by allowing the review rate to be endogenised, with a player reviewing
his strategy only when his switching cost draw is exceeded by the expected
payoﬀ gain from a strategy switch. This overcomes the weakness in models
(like those using the single-revisions dynamic) that assume an exogenous
review rate, by instead having it determined as part of the model.
These considerations do not matter for the coordination games of Nor-
man (2003a), where the rate of review is irrelevant for long-run selection
results: the deterministic dynamic in a given state only points in the di-
rection of one absorbing state (0 or N), and so however quickly or slowly
players review, they are only going to end up at one equilibrium. In Hawk-
Dove games, however, the speed of adjustment has been seen in section
3 to be crucial for long-run selection; fast review led play to the extreme
recurrent class f0;Ng, whilst slower review (as delivered by the “contrac-
tion” conditions) was required for selection of the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium. As discussed, the “contraction” conditions essentially require that a
suﬃciently small fraction of those players whose current best-response is to
switch strategies actually do so, and that this fraction shrink the closer is
the current state to the mixed-strategy equilibrium. It was seen in section 3
that this either implied a requirement of very slow review, or left one with
the project of trying to provide a theoretical foundation for a dynamic which




39This is also the approach of Myatt and Wallace (1998) and Blume (1999).
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¯ c = 0
¯ c = 1
¯ c = 2
¯ c = 3
Figure 7: Probability Pr(∆(z)) of a randomly selected player switching strategies
sees the fraction of adjusting players fall (suﬃciently quickly) as the system
approaches the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
But this is precisely what is accomplished by the simultaneous-revisions
stochastic switching costs model of subsection 4.2.2. Essentially, Proposi-
tion 8’s threshold mean switching cost for long-run selection of the mixed-
strategy equilibrium captures the requirement that evolution be suﬃciently
slow; the endogenous review rate is lower the higher is the mean switch-
ing cost, as illustrated in ﬁgure 7.40 Moreover, the review rate falls as
the system approaches the mixed-strategy equilibrium, since lower expected
payoﬀ gains are at stake. Under stochastic switching costs and simultane-
ous revisions then, convergence to the mixed-strategy equilibrium has more
satisfactory theoretical foundations.
A closer look at ﬁgure 7 yields some intuition for the selection results.


















tends to zero at (z¤=N) as ¯ c ! 1. Meanwhile, it tends to 1 in the extreme
states (z=N) = 0 and (z=N) = 1 as ¯ c ! 0. Since the values Pr(∆(0)) =
Pr(∆(N)) = 1 would make f0;Ng a recurrent class (of the perturbed model),
whilst Pr(∆(z¤)) = 0 would make z¤ an absorbing state, one should expect
there to exist a threshold level of the mean switching cost ¯ c below which
f0;Ng is selected in the long run, and above which z¤ is selected. This has
of course been demonstrated to be the case.
It is also worth noting that the selection results could be strengthened
in one obvious way. The best-response dynamic was employed for simplicity
and in order to focus attention on the signiﬁcance of switching costs for the
rate of review, but there is no reason why more boundedly rational response
mechanisms could not be admitted. Indeed, a truly realistic model would
require inertia to be present with various other forms of bounded rationality,
such as simple rules of thumb, imitation and so on. Such a retreat from best-
response would serve further to slow the pace of evolution, further reducing
the attractiveness of the extreme states, with fewer players likely to make the
optimal strategy switch in any given period. As a result, a lower threshold ˆ c
would be required for long-run selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the belief that player inertia is an important
phenomenon in repeated game contexts, and that it is driven in large part
by the presence of switching costs to changes in behaviour. Such switching
costs are introduced within a stochastically adaptive population repeatedly
playing a Hawk-Dove game. The mixed-strategy equilibrium of such games
is appealing by virtue of being the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium,
and yet its long-run selection in stochastic evolutionary models has proved
problematic; the required conditions on the deterministic dynamic generally
dictate extremely slow evolution, or a review rate that falls as the system
approaches the mixed-strategy equilibrium. The presence of switching costs
emerges as unhelpful in this regard in a uniform-mutations setting, serv-
ing further to illustrate the limitations of this modelling framework. By
contrast, the (simultaneous-revisions) state-dependent mutations model of
section 4 overcomes the diﬃculties. By allowing the mutation (or review)
rate to be endogenously determined by stochastic switching costs, a mech-
anism for slower, payoﬀ-sensitive evolution is built into the model. Indeed,
since the expected payoﬀ gains at stake fall the closer is the system to the
mixed-strategy equilibrium, so does the endogenous review rate, in precisely
38the manner required for selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium. This is
duly delivered for suﬃciently high mean switching costs.
And so, unusually, the mixed-strategy equilibrium has a satisfactory the-
oretical foundation as the long-run equilibrium of a stochastic evolutionary
model. Happily, it is clearly superior in terms of expected payoﬀs to the al-
ternative equilibrium - the miserable extreme state cycle f0;Ng where play-
ers are constantly coordinating their actions. Nonetheless, this ineﬃcient
cycle remains the long-run equilibrium if the mean switching cost is below
the threshold required for selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium. In
this case, one might anticipate that players would attempt to condition their
behaviour on their roles in the game (i.e., Row player or Column player),
which in any case is likely to deliver outcomes superior to the mixed-strategy
equilibrium.41 Relatedly, they might attempt to condition their strategies
on some other information (e.g., race, gender, income, eye colour), leading
to the decentralised emergence of “discriminatory norms” and even classes,
as in Axtell, Epstein, and Young (2001). When such conditioning is not
possible, however, the results of this paper suggest an appealing foundation
for the selection of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, and the avoidance of the
worst-case scenario of the extreme state cycle.
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